氢电综合电力系统的网络安全：漏洞识别、影响分析与攻防策略

The interdependence of cyber and physical infrastructures in hydrogen-integrated power systems introduces significant cybersecurity challenges for the reliable and secure delivery of sustainable energy. Addressing these challenges requires a thorough understanding of potential attack surfaces and their impacts, alongside the development of effective defense and mitigation strategies. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the inherent cyber-physical vulnerabilities within these systems, followed by an evaluation of the potential effects of cyberattacks on system performance. A tri-level attack-defense model is proposed, where the upper level examines attacker strategies and the two lower levels focus on defense mechanisms. The middle level addresses operational strategies for the hydrogen system, while the lower level is dedicated to distribution system operations, facilitating effective management of third-party hydrogen integration. Additionally, a stealthy attack model is introduced to simulate the sophisticated capabilities of modern attackers, designed to bypass traditional detection methods. A multiwave attack is analyzed to assess the model's resilience, and sensitivity studies are conducted to evaluate robustness. The effectiveness of the proposed model is validated through various attack scenarios on modified 15-node, 33-node, and 69-node test systems. Simulation results highlight the impacts of cyberattacks and demonstrate the efficacy of the developed attack-defense model.