多区域电力系统中的先天网络免疫与后天网络免疫

Organisms have evolved innate and acquired immune systems to defend against pathogens like coronaviruses. Similarly, power networks, threatened by cyber-attacks, desire cyber-immunity. Inspired by the immunology research, this study develops a cyber-immune strategy—characterizing innate cyber-immunity and establishing acquired cyber-immunity—for any selected portion of a power network (termed as power subnetwork) against stealthy false data injection (FDI) cyber-attacks. Therein, without extrinsic protection and information asymmetry, this paper for the first time confirms the existence and provides closed-form conditions for power subnetworks that are innately immune to FDI cyber-attacks despite all measurements being compromised. Single-leader-multi-follower bi-level optimization models are then developed to strategically allocate measurement protection, leading to the acquired cyber-immunity, whose conditions for existence and the least cost are explicitly formulated. More importantly, a bi-directional cyber-immunity propagation mechanism is presented to provide the optimal spatial allocation of defense resources across adjacent subnetworks. It also explicitly determines the temporal allocation sequence, revealing its sequential and cumulative impacts on establishing cyber-immunity. This is achieved by designing recursive traversal algorithms, one of which is modelled as a post-order depth-first-search problem of a multi-fork tree. The proposed subnetwork-specific cyber-immune strategy is verified in a modified Australian National Electricity Market.