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电力系统中的安全频率调节:针对FDI、DoS和延迟网络攻击的综合防御策略
Secure frequency regulation in power system: A comprehensive defense strategy against FDI, DoS, and latency cyber-attacks
| 作者 | Shaohua Yang · Keng-Weng Lao · Hongxun Hui · Jinshuo Su · Sheng Wang |
| 期刊 | Applied Energy |
| 出版日期 | 2025年1月 |
| 卷/期 | 第 379 卷 |
| 技术分类 | 电动汽车驱动 |
| 技术标签 | SiC器件 调峰调频 |
| 相关度评分 | ★★★★★ 5.0 / 5.0 |
| 关键词 | A novel defense strategy to ensure the cyber-security of power system frequency. |
语言:
中文摘要
摘要 维持频率稳定对电力系统的安全至关重要,而深度的信息物理交互使得频率调节易受网络攻击风险的影响。虚假数据注入(FDI)攻击、拒绝服务(DoS)攻击以及延迟攻击是电力系统中常见的典型网络攻击类型,它们各自通过不同的机制恶化系统频率,带来严重的安全威胁。然而,现有针对频率调节的研究在安全性方面缺乏能够全面应对所有这些攻击类型的综合解决方案。为填补这一空白,本文研究了一种保障电力系统频率调节安全的安全策略。首先,在考虑上述各类攻击的前提下,建立了系统频率调节模型,揭示了网络安全问题的严重性,特别是因网络攻击导致无法维持系统频率的问题。此外,提出了一种具备网络韧性的控制(CRC)策略,以全面抵御FDI、DoS和延迟攻击。该CRC策略包含两个步骤:安全面设计与辅助轨迹控制。安全面作为抵御多种网络攻击的防护屏障,而辅助轨迹控制则激活安全面的防御能力,从而确保系统频率的安全性。进一步地,基于Lyapunov定理给出了严格的稳定性证明,表明即使在多种网络攻击同时发生的情况下,所提出的CRC策略仍能保证系统的稳定性。最后,测试结果验证了CRC策略的有效性。例如,该策略能够防止已有的频率振荡与失稳现象,并在多种网络攻击下将最大频率偏差降低约96.61%。因此,所提出的CRC策略能够全面防御FDI、DoS和延迟网络攻击,显著提升电力系统的安全性。
English Abstract
Abstract Maintaining frequency is crucial for the security of power systems , while deep cyber–physical interactions make frequency regulation susceptible to cyber-attack risks. False data injection (FDI) attacks, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, and latency attacks are typical types of cyber-attacks prevalent in power systems, each capable of deteriorating system frequency through distinct mechanisms and posing serious security risks. However, existing studies on frequency regulation lack security aspects that can comprehensively address all these attack types. To fill this gap, this paper investigates a security strategy to safeguard power system frequency regulation. First, considering all these attacks, the system frequency regulation system is modeled to reveal the severity of cyber-security problems, specifically the failure to maintain frequency due to cyber-attacks. Moreover, a cyber-resilient control (CRC) strategy is developed to counter FDI, DoS , and latency attacks comprehensively. The CRC strategy involves a two-step process, including a safety surface and auxiliary trajectory control . The safety surface serves as a defensive barrier against multiple cyber-attacks, while the auxiliary trajectory control activates the safety surface’s defense capability, thereby ensuring the security of system frequency. Furthermore, rigorous proofs are given based on Lyapunov theorem, demonstrating that system stability can be guaranteed by the developed CRC strategy, even under multiple types of cyber-attacks. Finally, test results confirm the efficacy of the CRC strategy. For instance, it prevents pre-existing frequency oscillations and destabilization , and also reduces the maximum frequency deviation by approximately 96.61% under multiple cyber-attacks. Therefore, the developed CRC strategy can comprehensively defend against FDI, DoS, and latency cyber-attacks, significantly contributing to the power system security.
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SunView 深度解读
该网络安全防御策略对阳光电源储能系统具有重要价值。ST系列PCS和PowerTitan在参与电网调频服务时,面临FDI、DoS等网络攻击风险。论文提出的网络弹性控制(CRC)策略可集成到iSolarCloud平台,通过安全面和辅助轨迹控制双重机制,保障储能系统在网络攻击下的频率响应能力。特别是在虚拟同步发电机(VSG)控制模式下,该防御策略可将频率偏差降低96.61%,显著提升储能调频系统的安全性和可靠性,为电网级储能应用提供网络安全保障方案。