面向指数无界虚假数据注入攻击的隐私保护、安全感知与抗攻击分布式协同控制

This paper proposes a fully distributed, privacy-preserving, and safety-aware attack-resilient (P2SA2R) control framework for islanded inverter-based AC microgrids. The method ensures frequency regulation, voltage containment, and power sharing while withstanding a broad class of cyberattacks, including exponentially unbounded false data injection (EU-FDI) attacks on control inputs. Unlike prior work that addresses either transient safety or steady-state resilience in isolation, the proposed framework guarantees both, maintaining system states ultimately within safety bounds throughout the attacks. This is particularly critical for low-inertia inverter-based microgrids, which are highly susceptible to large overshoots and severe fluctuations during transients caused by disturbances or cyber threats. To address the vulnerability of information leakage due to eavesdropping in communication networks, a dynamic attack-aware output masking mechanism is integrated into the secondary control layer. This approach preserves privacy during information exchange with immediate neighbors in distributed control, without compromising consensus accuracy. Leveraging the privacy-preserved, an intelligent and fully distributed attack-resilient control framework is developed. A quadratic program (QP) is formulated to achieve the multiple objectives of the proposed P2SA2R strategy. By unifying Control Barrier Functions (CBFs) and Control Lyapunov Functions (CLFs), a rigorous theoretical analysis guarantees both ultimate safety and uniformly ultimately bounded (UUB) resilience under adversarial conditions. Simulation results on a modified IEEE 34-bus system confirm the framework’s effectiveness in achieving safety, privacy, and resilience under severe cyber threats.